By John Thomas Farquhar
Greater than a device of coverage makers to assemble intelligence, Air strength reconnaissance efforts formed early chilly struggle doctrine and warfare making plans. Dr. Farquhar argues lack of awareness on Soviet strategic features ruled the association, operational making plans, and kit of the postwar Air strength. To aid his statement, Farquhar strains the improvement of aerial reconnaissance from the 1st balloon ascents via global conflict II as a prelude. He then examines early chilly struggle peripheral reconnaissance and overflights of the Soviet Union. He explains the evolution of intelligence-gathering know-how, bureaucratic progress, and a relative loss of realization paid to digital battle sooner than the Korean battle. established totally on archival resources, the e-book serves as a great reference for air doctrine, intelligence, and digital war within the adolescence of the chilly struggle.
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Greater than a device of coverage makers to assemble intelligence, Air strength reconnaissance efforts formed early chilly struggle doctrine and conflict making plans. Dr. Farquhar argues lack of knowledge on Soviet strategic features ruled the association, operational making plans, and kit of the postwar Air strength.
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Extra info for A Need to Know: The Role of Air Force Reconnaissance in War Planning, 1945-1953
36 Planners concluded, “The cost of liquidating her [the Soviet Union] massive ground forces in a war of attrition by the direct application of our ground armies would be prohibitive. ”37 Thus, Pincher’s war plans stressed the destruction of the Soviet will to resist by crushing her war-making capacity through air bombardment. R. 39 The JCS relied on the theory of strategic aerial bombardment as the primary American response to war with the Soviet Union. This reliance was due to the perceived American weakness shown by demobilization and severe budget limits.
Spotted by aerial photography, the Kiska radar afforded a unique opportunity to learn about Japanese equipment. Knowing few details, American electronic analysts assumed Japanese radar technology to be inferior. Consequently, “Ferret I,” a modified B-24D, conducted a series of flights with varied success. 50 Nevertheless, Ferret I blazed the trail for American electronic reconnaissance. 13 A NEED TO KNOW 7 Flight No. 6 6 B-17 42-29644 14–15 June 1943 Route around Sardinia Ferret Flight 8 9 E 10 5 11 Caccia Comino SARDINIA D B C Teulada Pula A Carbonara Spartivento 2 3 4 1 Positions of radars on the island at the time (from German records).
Office of Scientific Research and Development, to A. , RRL, letter, subject: London Mission, 9 July 1944, AOC Archive, 2, file: Dr. O. Villard. 71. Memorandum, subject: Electronics Intelligence Sub-Section, Directorate of Intelligence, 3 September 1944, file: USSTAF, D/Intel, Organization, box 297, Terman Papers. 72. From a wartime peak of 923 scientists, engineers, technicians, and administrative personnel, the RRL declined to 401 employees by December 1945 and to less than 25 by April 1946.